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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA L. AND MARK J. GRAY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050136-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendants appeal their conviction for child abuse, a second felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 1 and 2: Were defendants' trial attorneys ineffective in (1) not requesting a 
lesser-included offense instruction and (2) not retaining an expert to provide psychiatric 
testimony on the mental states of both defendants? 
Standard of Review for Both Issues: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised 
for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,16, 89 
P.3d 162. 
1 
Issue 3: Did instructing the jury that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree 
of proof that. . . obviates all reasonable doubt" violate defendant's due process rights? 
Standard of Review: "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is 
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial 
court's ruling." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted), cert, 
denied, 510 U.S. 979(1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (West 2004): 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to 
inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the 
second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West 2004): 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, 
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or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants, Christina L. Gray and Mark J. Gray ("defendants" or "the Grays"), 
were charged with child abuse, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-109 (West 2004). CGP at 4; MGP at 5.l A jury found them guilty as charged. CGP at 83; 
MGP at 74. The trial court sentenced each of them to an indeterminate prison term of one to 
fifteen years. CGP at 123-125; MGP at 113-115. The court suspended the prison terms, 
placed them on probation for three years, and ordered each of them to serve a six-month jail 
term. Id. The court ordered that Christina begin serving her jail term on January 17, 2005, 
and that Mark begin serving his term on July 15, 2005. Id. 
1
 The State refers to the pleadings volume in Christina Gray's case as CGP, the 
pleadings volume in Mark Gray's case as MGP and the trial transcripts as TT. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Chained in the basement, u[a]ll day and all night" 
J.G. was 10 or 11 years old when his father, Mark Gray, and stepmother, Christina 
Gray, began chaining him to a cinder block on the cement floor in the basement of their 
Magna home. TT 118, 138-39,233-35. While defendants released J.G. to go to school and 
to come upstairs for his meals, he spent a large amount of his time in restraints. TT 234-236, 
241. J.G. testified that his father sometimes took him upstairs to eat, but that he otherwise 
spent "[a] 11 day and all night" chained in the basement. TT 236. Defendants often kept him 
in his underwear on the cement floor of the laundry room hallway with access to little more 
than a rug and a blanket. TT 239-40. 
J.G. claimed that Christina sometimes threw water and turned a fan on him while he 
was chained and that she sometimes hit and kicked him. TT 239,241. He also claimed that 
Christina struck him with a board, and threw jalapeno pepper juice in his eyes. TT 241-42, 
270. He told the jury that when the family went to a drive-in movie, Christina would 
sometimes put a sheet over his head so he could not see the screen. TT 246. "She says she 
hates me." TT 242. 
J.G. claimed Christina repeatedly stabbed at him with a fork and showed one 
investigator a scar with four dots, three in a line and one slightly offset. TT 160. The 
investigator stated that the dots were consistent with a fork. Id, J.G. pointed to the 
unaligned dot and explained that one prong of the fork was bent. Id. 
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J.G. also told the investigator that he had hidden ajar of peanut butter in the basement 
because he "was hungry and Christina wasn't feeding [him]." TT 134,237. During a later 
search, the investigator found the jar where J.G. said he had placed it, "a place where you 
couldn't get to unless he described it." TT 160. 
Tic-tac-toe 
Numerous witnesses confirmed that J.G. was in fact chained in the basement. Family 
friend Alyce Johnson first saw him chained in the basement in the summer of 2002. TT 37-
38. When Alyce went to the Gray home eight months later, she saw J.G. in the living room, 
"sitting at the table." TT 44. "[H]e didn't have a shirt on and he had tic-tac-toe on his face 
and he had writing across his back." Id. He was "embarrassed because [he was] in his 
underwear and his feet [were] handcuffed." TT 45. Christina told her that the writing on 
J.G.'s back was his address. TT 53. Christina said that Colleena, a teenager who lived with 
the family, had put the tic-tac-toe on J.G.'s face. TT 57. Christina said that Colleena "likes 
to cause problems." Id. 
In approximately September 2003, Alyce again saw J.G. in the basement. He was 
sitting in the hallway area in his underwear. TT 46. He had "a dirty pillow next to him, 
some books next to him and a chain on his ankle." TT 47. This time, Alyce called child 
protective services. Id. 
2
 Colleena denied that she had written the tic-tac-toe sign. TT 422. 
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J. G. is taken into custody 
On October 1, 2003, patrol officer Michael Lee went to the Gray home and asked to 
speak to J.G.'s parents. TT 73, 75. When told that the parents were not home, Officer Lee 
asked to see J.G. Id. A teenage girl invited the officer in and went to get J.G. Id. When she 
returned with J.G., she had a pair of handcuffs in her hands. TT 76. The detective also went 
to the basement where he found a piece of chain connected to a cinderblock in a hallway near 
the laundry room. TT 82-83. He saw a braided rug, a thin pillow, some books, and a towel, 
but no blankets or mattress. TT 83, 85. When he asked the children "what [the area] was 
for," they told him "that's where they had to chain up [J.G.] because he ran away." TT 86. 
Defendant Mark Gray admitted to Detective Lee that he and Christina used a chain to 
restrain J.G. See TT 87,159. Mark or Christina said that "Deputy [James] Timpson had told 
them that that's what they needed to do, is chain him up with handcuffs." Id. at 94. Mark 
told Detective Lee that they had been handcuffing J.G. for "about a month." Id. at 98. This 
was over a year after Alyce had first observed J.G. in chains and Christina had told her that 
he "had come home from running away and that she had chained him down in the 
basement." TT 37-38. Christina and Mark had also told their friend and neighbor Jean 
Woolston about the chaining. TT 456. They said that "[J.G.] ran away all the time and they 
didn't know what to do." Id. As Deputy Lee placed J.G. in the patrol car for transport, 
3
 When Deputy Timson testified, he denied that he had a discussion with defendants 
about chaining J.G. TT308. 
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neither defendant hugged him. TT 88,102. As J.G. was leaving, Mark Gray tapped him on 
the shoulder and said "Goodbye, Jeff." TT 103. Christina Gray did nothing. Id. 
Defendants' story 
Defendants claimed that they kept J.G. in his underwear to prevent his running away. 
TT 314. J.G. had academic and behavioral difficulties at school. See TT 323-389 (testimony 
of school resource teacher, school social worker, school principal). At home, "he was hard 
to deal with" and "made .. .life miserable." TT 41. Christina told her friend that she hated 
J.G. TT 40. J.G. ran away repeatedly. TT 253. Defendants attempted to control his 
behavior in various ways, but eventually determined to restrain him. 
Teachers, social workers and even the principal at J.G.'s elementary school all 
testified to his discipline problems and propensity for running away. See, e.g., TT 330,347, 
362. The school's principal ranked J.G.'s disciplinary problems as "among my top three" in 
11 years of school administration. TT 371. The principal also described the Grays as "very 
good. They recognized the problem." TT 359. "They were very responsive to a kid that 
was in crisis." TT 380. A neighbor described Christina Gray as a normal "stay-at-home 
mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the other children. TT 447, 449-51. 
Coleena Norman, a teenager who lived with the Grays for about six months in 2003, 
testified that J.G. was chained intermittently over a three-month period and only when adults 
were not present to prevent him from running away. TT 423. Jason Kass, another family 
friend who lived for a time with the Grays, stated that he saw J.G. chained "very few times." 
TT 431. He also testified that he never saw Christina beat or stab J.G. and that when she did 
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punish him it was only by taking privileges away. TT 432. He also said that he had 
accompanied the Gray family to the drive-in and that he never saw Christina place a blanket 
or towel over J.G.'s head. TT 434. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendants' trial attorneys were not ineffective for not requesting a lesser-
included offense jury instruction on class A misdemeanor child abuse. First, trial counsels' 
performance evinces a legitimate trial strategy—gaining acquittal for their clients—and 
therefore cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Second, the defendants 
were not entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not 
support an acquittal on the greater charge and a conviction on the lesser. Third, defendants 
suffered no prejudice because they would have been convicted of felony child abuse even if 
the instruction had been given. 
Point II: Defendants' trial attorneys were not ineffective in not presenting expert 
testimony on their mental states. First, testimony on the mens rea of a defendant at the time 
of the offense is inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Second, counsel's decisions 
concerning which witnesses to call for trial are classic strategic decisions that cannot support 
a claim of ineffective assistance. 
Point III: The jury instruction on reasonable doubt correctly states the law, even 
though it uses the phrase "obviates all reasonable doubt." First, defendants cannot pursue 
this claim on appeal because any error was invited through defense counsel's affirmation of 
the jury instructions. Second, defendants cannot raise this claim for the first time on appeal. 
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Because they cannot demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting review of an 
unpreserved claim, it should not be considered. Third, even on the merits, this claim fails 
because the prosecutor did not misstate the burden of proof by arguing that the State need 
only obviate doubts that are "sufficiently defined." Finally, the instructions, taken as a 
whole, properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS' TRIAL ATTORNEYS WERE NOT 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REQUESTING A LESSER-
INCLUDED OFFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION. 
Defendants argue that they received ineffective assistance because their trial attorneys 
did not request a lesser-included offense jury instruction. Aplt. Br. at 29. This claim fails. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both prongs of 
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), whichholds that 
such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's performance 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687-88; see also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 
App.1994). A defendant's burden is extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can 
"succeed[ ] only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from 
counsel's actions." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App.1995) (citation and 
quotations omitted). Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 
877 (Utah 1993) (footnote citations omitted). 
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When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not enough to show 
that his or her counsel's performance could have been better. The Sixth Amendment entitles 
a criminal defendant "only to effective assistance of counsel, not to the best or most 
complete representation available." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see 
also Boydv. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999) (counsel's performance is deficient 
only if petitioner shows it was "completely unreasonable, not merely wrong"). 
As demonstrated below, defendants do not meet their burden to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
A, Trial Counsel's Performance Was Not Deficient Because It 
Reflected a Legitimate Trial Strategy. 
Defendants' claim that their trial attorneys were deficient because they did not request 
a lesser-included offense instruction is refuted by the fact that counsel's performance at trial 
evince a legitimate trial strategy—to gain acquittal for their clients. 
A decision to seek acquittal rather than face the risk of conviction on a lesser-included 
offense is a reasonable trial strategy. See, e.g.. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 723 (Utah App. 
1997) (counsel's decision not to request a lesser-included offense instruction consistent with 
trial strategy and does not constitute ineffective assistance), cert, denied 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1998); Benefieldv. State, 557 S.E.2d 476,478-79 (Ga. App. 2001) ("Counsel's decision not 
to request a jury charge on a lesser included offense and to pursue an 'all or nothing' defense 
is a matter of trial strategy and does not amount to ineffective assistance"); State v. Griffie, 
658 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ohio 1996) ("[f]ailure to request jury instructions on lesser-included 
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offenses is a matter of trial strategy and does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel") 
(citation omitted). 
In State v. Hall, this Court considered a claim of ineffective assistance by a defendant 
who had been convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Hall, 946 P.2d at 715. Hall 
claimed on appeal that his attorney's performance was deficient because he should have 
requested jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Id. This Court had no 
difficulty disposing of Hall's claim because requesting a lesser-included offense would 
contradict the defense's theory of the case, i.e., that the charges were fabricated: 
Defense counsel's failure to request the instructions . . . is entirely consistent 
with his trial strategy. Defense counsel argued throughout trial that A.C. was 
lying about the alleged abuse, and suggested that A.C.'s mother had devised 
the allegations. Thus, defense counsel's request for instructions on lesser 
included offenses would have been inconsistent with his assertion that 
defendant never touched A.C. 
M a t 723. 
Similarly, here, defendants' strategy was that they were blameless. Part of that 
strategy involved attacking J.G.'s credibility by suggesting through the testimony of various 
witnesses that he was lying or at least exaggerating his allegations against his parents. J.G. 
testified that he was chained to a cinder block on the floor in the basement hallway "for a 
long time," " all day and all night." TT 235-36. He claimed Christina, his stepmother, beat 
him, stabbed him with a fork, placed a sheet over his head at a drive-in movie so he could 
not see and forced him to sleep on the floor in water with a fan blowing on him. TT 239, 
241, 242, 246. The defense disputed these allegations through testimony from family 
friends. For example, Coleena Norman, a teenager who lived with the Grays for about six 
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months in 2003, testified that J.G. was chained only intermittently over a three-month period 
and only when adults were not present to prevent him from running away. TT 423. Jason 
Kass, another family friend who lived for a time with the Grays, stated that he saw J.G. 
chained "very few times." TT 431. He also testified that he never saw Christina beat or stab 
J.G. and that when she did punish him it was only by taking privileges away. TT 432. He 
also said that he had accompanied the Gray family to the drive-in and that he never saw 
Christina place a blanket or towel over J.G.'s head. TT 434. 
Defendants' "all or nothing" strategy was also evident in their attempts to advance a 
"mistake of law" defense by arguing that they honestly and reasonably believed they were 
acting responsibly and legally in restraining J.G. to prevent him from running away. 
Defendants claim their belief was reasonable because Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy 
James Timpson, who met with the Grays early on to discuss methods to keep J.G. from 
running away, allegedly endorsed the chaining. See, e.g., TT 491-92. Deputy Timpson 
denied making such a statement, TT 309, but defendants' version was at least partially 
corroborated by Ernest Broderick, J.G.'s school principal, who was present during the 
meeting with Timpson. According to Broderick, Christina told Timpson that J.G. was so fast 
that she felt like she "almost needed to handcuff him to [her]." TT 365. Broderick recalled 
Timpson telling Christina that handcuffing J.G. to her would "probably be reasonable under 
those circumstances and I believe I agreed with it too. . . ." TT 365-66. 
The "mistake of law" defense was also embodied in Jury Instruction 20, which states: 
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake concerning the existence of a 
penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
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1. Due to his or her ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his or her conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
2. His or her ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable 
reliance upon: 
a. An official statement of the law contained in a written 
order or grant of permission by an administrative agency 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; 
or 
b. A written interpretation of the law contained in an 
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question. 
MGP 96; CGP 105. 
Finally, this strategy was also evident in the defendants' attempts to portray 
themselves as earnest, caring parents who were at their wits' end in attempting to deal with a 
child who was deeply disturbed due to the abuse inflicted on him by his birth mother, who 
had custody of him until he was five years old. Teachers, social workers and even the 
principal at J.G.'s elementary school all testified to his discipline problems and propensity 
for running away. See, e.g., TT 330, 347, 362. The school's principal ranked J.G.'s 
disciplinary problems as "among my top three" in 11 years of school administration. TT 
371. The principal also described the Grays as "very good. They recognized the problem." 
TT 359. "They were very responsive to a kid that was in crisis." TT 380. A neighbor 
described Christina Gray as a normal "stay-at-home mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the 
other children. TT 447, 449-51. 
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Clearly, counsel's trial strategy was to have their clients exonerated. Through 
testimony of houseguests, neighbors and school officials, the Grays attempted to portray 
themselves as concerned parents coping as best they could with a disturbed child. Testimony 
concerning J.G.'s alleged propensity to lie or exaggerate and the alleged alleaged 
endorsement of chaining J.G. to restrain him both suggest a defense strategy aimed at the 
entirely reasonable goal of acquittal. A lesser-included offense instruction would have been 
inconsistent with this strategy because it would entail an admission of guilt. Because the 
performance of the defense attorneys reflects a reasonable trial strategy, they cannot be 
found ineffective for taking actions that would be inconsistent with that strategy. 
B. The Defendants Have Not Shown Prejudice From Their Counsel's 
Alleged Deficient Performance Where They Have Not 
Demonstrated That (1) They Were Entitled to the Lesser-included 
Offense Instruction or (2) There Is a Reasonable Probability of a 
Different Result If the Instruction Had Been Given. 
Defendants have not shown prejudice. Defendants claim the jury should have been 
given the lesser-included offense instruction because jurors should have been given the 
option of convicting them of class A misdemeanor child abuse, an offense they now believe 
would have been more appropriate because they believed that chaining J.G. in the basement 
was necessary to keep him from harming himself by running away. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 32. 
Thus, they claim their attorneys erred in not requesting a lesser-included offense instruction. 
This argument fails, first, because they were not entitled to the lesser-included offense 
instruction and, second, because the Grays would still have been convicted of felony child 
abuse even if the instruction had been given. 
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In Utah, "[a] defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision;..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004). A defendant may be convicted 
of a charged offense or a lesser-included offense, but not both. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3) (West 2004). An offense is a lesser-included offense if "[i]t is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged;.. ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (West 2004). 
When a defendant requests a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court need 
not grant the request "unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(4) (West 2004). Thus, to make this determination, the trial court must perform a two-
part analysis. "First, the trial court must determine whether the offense for which the 
defendant seeks instruction is a lesser included offense of the crime charged Second, the 
trial court must determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could acquit the 
defendant of the offense charged and convict of the lesser offense." State v. Payne, 964 P.2d 
327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) (additional 
citations omitted)). 
But even if there is a rational basis for the instruction, reversal is not required if the 
defendants suffered no prejudice. Id. at 334. "For an error to require reversal, 'the likelihood 
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of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" 
State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,902 (Utah App. 1996) (quotingState v. Knight, 734P.2d913, 
920 (Utah 1987)). Reversal is inappropriate when compelling evidence supports the 
conviction. Payne, 964 P.2d at 334. 
At trial, defendants readily admitted that they had chained J.G. to a brick in the 
basement. Indeed, as they acknowledge in their brief, they were quick to admit to their 
conduct, even after they were given their Miranda warnings by investigating officers. See, 
e.g., Aplt. Br. at 25.4 The defendants' fundamental strategy at trial was that they honestly 
believed they were justified in chaining J.G. to keep him from running away; in fact, they 
went so far as to claim that Deputy Timpson told them chaining was warranted under the 
circumstances. See, e.g., TT 94. 
On appeal, defendants claim that the jury should have been given a lesser-included 
offense instruction on class A misdemeanor child abuse, which is committed by infliction of 
However, although both defendants acknowledged chaining J.G. in the basement, 
they both consistently minimized the extent of their conduct. For example, when first 
confronted by Deputy Lee in the fall of 2003 about the chaining, Mark Gray stated that they 
had only been chaining J.G. for about a month. TT 98. This testimony is inconsistent with 
J.G.'s own testimony as well as that of other witnesses, such as Alyce Johnson, who testified 
that she saw J.G. chained in the summer of 2002. TT 37-38. Additionally, Christina Gray 
later acknowledged that "I made a mistake when I supported Mark's decision to use the 
chain" and that she felt guilty about using the chain. See Parenting of Mark and Christina 
Grey, MGP 112, at 2. 
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serious physical injury upon a child through criminal negligence.5 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(2)(c) (West 2004). Under Utah law, a person is criminally negligent regarding 
"circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (West 
2004). 
By contrast, a defendant commits second degree felony child abuse if he or she 
intentionally or knowingly inflicts serious physical injury upon a child. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-109(2)(a) (West 2004); see also, e.g., Jury Instruction 16 (MGP 92, CGP 101). The 
terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" are defined as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
5
 "Serious physical injury" is "any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously 
impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional 
harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(l)(d) (West 2004). "Serious physical injury" includes "any conduct toward a child 
which results in severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe 
impairment of the child's ability to function," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109( 1 )(d)(vii) (West 
2004), and "any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(x) (West 2004). 
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(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. According to the Utah Supreme Court, intentional or willful 
"means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or 
inadvertently . . . Willful, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, 
implies a willingness to commit the act. . . . Willful does not require an intent to violate the 
law or to injure another or acquire any advantage" State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 
n.3 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 
88, |^ 20, 67 P.3d 1050 (defendant need not intend to violate the law; rather, he need only 
intend to "do the prohibited act"). Similarly, "a person does not need to 'form the intent to 
commit a specific crime or intend the result that occurred to be found guilty of knowingly 
committing a crime.5" State v. Ottwell, 779 P.2d 500, 504 (Mont. 1989) (citation omitted). 
If defendants' attorneys had requested a jury instruction on misdemeanor child abuse, 
the trial court first had to determine whether it was a lesser-included offense. Class A 
misdemeanor child abuse is a lesser-included offense because its elements are identical to 
second-degree felony child abuse, except for the element of intent. See State v. Carruth, 
1999 UT 107, \ 16, n.9, 993 P.2d 869 ("'the distinction between the [greater and lesser 
offense] must be based upon the degree of risk or injury to person or property or upon grades 
of intent or degrees of culpability5") (quoting McElhanon v. State, 948 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ark. 
1997)). Thus, if a lesser-included offense had been requested, the trial court would have had 
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to "' decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the 
question to the jury.'" State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 354, ^  10, 79 P.3d 969) (quoting State 
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 160 (Utah 1983)), cert denied 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004). "'[W]hen 
the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury 
question exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of 
the defendant." Id. (brackets in original). 
The evidence supporting the convictions of second degree felony child abuse or that 
the defendants acted intentionally or knowingly was very strong. Numerous people testified 
to the fact that J.G. was chained to a cinder block in the basement; many witnesses had seen 
him firsthand. See, e.g., TT 38, 45, 76 (Alyce Johnson), 76, 77, 82 (Deputy Lee), 423 
(Colleena Norman), 431 -32 (Jason Kass). Additionally, the chain, cinderblock, the rug upon 
which J.G. slept were all seized by police and offered into evidence at trial. TT 115, 133, 
165-171. Some investigators also testified to seeing marks on J.G.'s ankles. TT 109, 163. 
J.G. testified that although he was released to go to school and to come upstairs for his 
meals, he spent a large amount of his time in restraints. TT 234-236, 241. He also testified 
that his father sometimes took him upstairs to eat, but that he otherwise spent "[a] 11 day and 
all night" chained in the basement. TT 236. Defendants often kept him in his underwear on 
the cement floor of the laundry room hallway with access to little more than a rug and a 
blanket. TT 239-40. J.G. claimed that Christina sometimes threw water and turned a fan on 
him while he was chained and that she sometimes hit and kicked him. TT 239,270. He also 
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claimed that Christina struck him with a board, repeatedly stabbed at him with a fork, and 
threw jalapeno pepper juice in his eyes. TT 241-42, 270. 
Other evidence corroborated his testimony. J.G. showed one investigator a scar with 
four dots, three in a line and one slightly offset. TT 160. The investigator stated that the 
dots were consistent with a fork. Id. J.G. pointed to the unaligned dot and explained that 
one prong of the fork was bent. Id. J.G. also told the investigator that he had hidden ajar of 
peanut butter in the basement because he "was hungry and Christina wasn't feeding [him]." 
TT 134, 237. During a later search, the investigator found the jar where J.G. said he had 
placed it, "a place where you couldn't get to unless he described it." TT 160. 
As to the length of time J.G. was chained, Alyce Johnson, a family friend, testified to 
seeing J.G. chained to a cinder block in the basement as early as summer 2002. TT 37-38. 
More than a year later, Deputy Michael Lee responded to the Gray residence and found only 
children at home alone. TT 75. When he asked to see J.G., a 13-year-old girl eventually 
produced him and a pair of handcuffs. TT 76. One of the children also candidly 
acknowledged that the handcuffs were used to chain J.G. in the basement. TT 86. Deputy 
Lee testified that he went into the basement of the home and found in the hallway a cinder 
block, a chain, a braided rug over the cement floor, a thin pillow and a towel. TT 77, 82-85. 
A week later, police returned with a search warrant and seized the block, chain, rug and 
20 
pillow, many of which had been moved to various places around the home, garage and yard.6 
TT 115,132-33, 165-68, 171. 
It is true that defendants disputed some of these claims. Coleena Norman, the 
teenager who lived with the Grays during 2003, testified that J.G. was chained intermittently 
over a three-month period and only when adults were not present to prevent him from 
running away. TT 423. Jason Kass, another family friend who lived with the Grays, stated 
that he saw J.G. chained "very few times." TT 431. He also testified that he never saw 
Christina beat or stab J.G.; rather, she only punished him by taking privileges away. TT 432. 
He also said that he had never seen Christina place a blanket or towel over J.G.' s head at the 
drive in. TT434. 
Defendants maintained, both at trial and on appeal, that they honestly believed they 
were justified in chaining J.G. to keep him from running away and potentially harming 
himself. "[T]he Grays felt they were trying to protect J.G. from harming himself by running 
away. The defense argued that the Grays never tried to conceal the fact that they were 
chaining J.G. from anyone, including church acquaintances, friends, neighbors, and even 
police officers." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. They also argued that part of the reason they believed 
they were justified was that Deputy Timpson allegedly gave them permission. Id. 
In view of the foregoing, the defendants were not entitled to a lesser-included offense 
instruction because the evidence neither supported an acquittal on the charged nor conviction 
6
 The pillow, for example, was found inside the doghouse in the back yard. TT 168. 
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on the lesser. First, the defendants' claim that they believed they were justified does not 
negate the mens rea for the crime. As noted above, willful or intentional conduct does not 
necessarily involve "an intent to violate the law or to injure another or acquire any 
advantage.55 Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3. Rather, the defendants needed onlyto intend to 
"do the prohibited act," in this case chaining J.G. in the basement. Norton, 2003 UT App 88 
at If 20. Thus, even if defendants did not know they were violating the law, they could still be 
held accountable for intentionally and knowingly committing the acts that constituted second 
degree felony child abuse. 
Second, defendants would not have been entitled to an instruction on criminally 
negligent child abuse because there was no evidence that they were negligent. As noted 
above, a defendant is criminally negligent when he or she fails to perceive a "substantial and 
unjustifiable risk [and] . . . the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (West 2004). The evidence at 
trial did not indicate defendants were unaware of the risk of harm to J.G. from chaining; 
rather, they argued that they were justified in chaining J.G. in order to prevent a different 
harm. Defendants5 theory has always been that they were blameless because they had no 
choice but to chain J.G. This does not entail, however, that they were oblivious to the harm 
they were causing to J.G. They simply chose what they afterward claimed was the lesser of 
Indeed, it seems impossible that any parent would not be aware of the harm that 
could result from chaining a child in the basement on the floor for long periods of time. 
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two evils. Accordingly, their actions cannot be merely criminally negligent and they were 
not entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction. 
C. Defendants Suffered No Prejudice. 
Even assuming arguendo that defendants were entitled to a lesser-included offense 
instruction, they suffered no prejudice because, as recounted above, there was ample and 
largely unrebutted testimony that their actions in chaining J.G. in the basement were 
intentional and knowing. Because "compelling evidence supports the . . . conviction," 
"reversal is inappropriate." See Payne, 964 P.2d at 334; see also Jacques, 924 P.2d at 902 
("For an error to require reversal, 'the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'") (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendants' 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. 
n. DEFENDANTS' TRIAL ATTORNEYS WERE NOT 
INEFFECTIVE IN NOT RETAINING AN EXPERT TO 
TESTIFY ABOUT DEFENDANTS' MENTAL STATES. 
Defendants claim their trial attorneys were ineffective "for failing to recognize the 
need to call [an] expert witness on Mark and Christina's behalf with respect to the element of 
'intentionally and knowingly' causing harm to J.G." Aplt. Br. at 37. This claim is also 
without merit. 
A. Testimony Concerning Defendants5 Mental States Is Inadmissible. 
Defendants' trial attorneys cannot be found deficient for not introducing an expert on 
their mental states because such testimony is inadmissible. Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states unequivocally: "No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state 
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or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether 
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the 
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact." 
UtahR. Evid. 704(b); see also United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031,1037 (9th Cir.1997) 
(identical federal rule 704 prohibits "testimony from which it necessarily follows, if the 
testimony is credited, that the defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens red") 
(italics in original). As one court stated: "'Courts have interpreted Rule 704(b) to prohibit 
both the prosecution and the defense from inquiring of expert psychiatrists whether the 
defendant, at the time of the crime, was able to appreciate the wrongfulness or the nature and 
quality of his acts.'5' United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 32 F.3d 236, 238 (7th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, defendants cannot 
demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice because any attempt to admit such testimony 
would have been futile. 
B. Even If the Psychiatrist's Testimony Were Admissible, the Decision 
Not to Call an Expert Is a Strategy Decision and, Therefore, 
Cannot Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Even if psychiatric expert testimony were admissible, defendants' claim that their 
attorneys were ineffective in not calling such an expert is meritless because introducing 
expert testimony is a strategic decision within the discretion of counsel. 
Defendants claim their trial attorneys should have retained someone like Lawrence D. 
Beall, a Ph.D. psychologist and director of the Trauma Awareness & Treatment Center, who 
prepared a psychological assessment of both defendants at their behest for sentencing 
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purposes. See MGP 112, CGP 120. According to defendants, "Dr. Beall's overall 
assessment of Mark and Christina does not attempt to controvert Dr. Corwin's determination 
that chaining is in the realm of psychological abuse/maltreatment, but instead explains how 
the chaining could have occurred by the Grays, whom Dr. Beall assessed to have 'no 
evidence of malicious intent.5" Aplt. Br. at 35-36 (emphasis added in original). 
As noted in section II.A., above, such testimony concerning the defendants' intent is 
not admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, some testimony concerning 
defendants' mental condition might be admissible for some other purpose. "[Ejxpert 
testimony is admissible if it merely ' supports] an inference or conclusion that the defendant 
did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the expert does not draw the ultimate 
inference or conclusion for the jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from the testimony.'" United States v. Bennett 161 F.3d 171,183 (3dCir. 
1998) (citation omitted), cert, denied 528 U.S. 819 (1999). Thus, assuming defendants could 
have fashioned Beall's testimony in a way that did not violate rule 704, some portions of it 
may have been admissible. 
Nonetheless, even assuming Beall's testimony was admissible, there are a number of 
reasons why defendants' trial attorneys cannot be found ineffective. First, defense counsel 
generally cannot be found constitutionally deficient for not introducing expert testimony. 
"Generally, the selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions of trial 
strategy and virtually unchallengeable." State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Mo. 1997) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 595 U.S. 1095. In assessing the reasonableness of representation, a 
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court should consider all circumstances surrounding the attorney's performance. State v. 
Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90)). Under 
Strickland, trial tactics and strategies, including witnesses, objections and defenses are 
"within the prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's professional 
judgments." Id. at 1256. "Furthermore, counsel's decision to call or not to call an expert 
witness is a matter of trial strategy, which will not be questioned and viewed as 
ineffectiveness unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision." Id. (citations omitted; 
emphasis added); Barkell v. State, 55 P.3d 1239, 1243 (Wyo. 2002) ("The decision not to 
call a witness is a strategic choice, normally within the judgment of counsel and will not be 
second-guessed with the benefit of hindsight. . ."); see also State v. Hartman, 754 N.E.2d 
1150, 1177 (Ohio 2001) (defense counsel's decision to rely on cross-examination of state's 
expert instead of calling his own "should be viewed as a legitimate 'tactical decision'..."). 
Thus, there is strong presumption that defendants' trial attorneys were performing within 
constitutional limits in choosing not to call an expert and defendants have not overcome this 
presumption. 
Second, such testimony from a psychologist would have been cumulative of that 
offered by other witnesses. Several other character witnesses, who described the Grays as 
loving, caring parents trying to cope with behavioral difficulties of a disturbed child, 
implicitly presented defendants' claim that they did not intentionally or knowingly harm J.G. 
With regard to the special challenges J.G. presented at his elementary school, the principal 
described the Grays as "very good. They recognized the problem." TT 359. "They were 
26 
very responsive to a kid that was in crisis." TT 380. Feleti Matagi, a DCFS evaluator, met 
with the Grays in 2003 after J.G. was removed from the home to determine whether the other 
children in the home were in danger. TT 391-92. He ultimately recommended that the 
remaining children remain in the home. TT 394. A neighbor described Christina Gray as a 
normal "stay-at-home mom[]" who treated J.G. just like the other children. TT 447,449-51. 
Thus, any additional evidence concerning defendant's intentions for an expert would have 
been merely cumulative. 
Finally, testimony from an expert that the Grays sincerely believed they had to chain 
J.G. for his own good does not negate the intent necessary for commission of second degree 
felony child abuse. As argued in section LB., above, the claim that defendants believed they 
were justified in chaining J.G. does not mean they did not intentionally or knowingly inflict 
serious physical injury upon a child. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (second degree 
felony child abuse). Moreover, the psychological assessments rarely directly address the 
chaining of J.G. and when they do, they generally acknowledge that the chaining was a 
mistake. For instance, one of the parenting assessments frankly states: "When a solution 
was inferred that seemed like the only feasible one left (i.e., restraints), they used it. As they 
have admitted to the evaluator, these restraints were a mistake." Parenting of Mark and 
Christina Gray, MGP 112, at p. 2. The report states that Christina Gray felt guilty about the 
chaining and quotes her as saying, "I made a mistake when I supported Mark's decision to 
use the chain." Id. 
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In short, defendants have not overcome the strong presumption that the decision not to 
call an expert witness was reasonable trial strategy and, therefore, constitutionally sound. 
Accordingly, defendants' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
III. INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE DEGREE OF PROOF 
NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION "OBVIATES ALL 
REASONABLE DOUBT" DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANTS' 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial violated his 
due process rights under the United States Utah Constitutions. See Aplt. Br. at 40. That 
reasonable doubt instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1997), overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, informed the 
jury that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind, 
convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and 
obviates all reasonable doubt." Jury Instruction No. 8, MGP 84; CGP 93 (Addendum A). 
However, after trial, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly abandoned]" the ""obviate all 
reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, H 30,116 P.3d 
305. 
Relying on Reyes, defendant argues that the "risk inherent in the use of the phrase 
'obviate all reasonable doubt5" may have led to violation of the defendants' due process 
rights. Aplt. Br. at 40. For the reasons set forth below, this argument fails. 
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A. Because Defendants Approved of the Jury Instruction They Now 
Challenge on Appeal, Their Claim Is Invited Error and Should Not 
Be Considered. 
Because defendants approved the reasonable doubt instruction, they cannot challenge 
it on appeal. "[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party 
led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 
1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the 
jury instruction.5" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
In Geukgeuzian, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed its caselaw and enumerated 
several examples of invited error. Id. at \ 10. A defendant invites error when his counsel 
"confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to the instructions given by the 
trial court." Id. (citing Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at f 55). A defendant also invites error where 
he fails to object to an instruction when asked specifically by the court. Id. (citing Anderson, 
929 P.2d at 1108-09) Finally, a defendant invites error when his counsel represents to the 
court that she read the instruction and had no objection to it. Id. (citing State v. Medina, 73 8 
P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)). 
Similarly, here, defendants invited the alleged error concerning the reasonable doubt 
instruction. Before the trial began, defense counsel informed the judge that they had 
reviewed the proposed instructions submitted by the State and that "we seem to have been 
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playing from the standard play book. Everything t hat I was going to submit is what they've 
already submitted so we would stipulate to what they've already given you." TT 1. Then, 
toward the trial's conclusion, the judge again reviewed the instruction with both parties. TT 
436-444. Defense counsel voiced concern specifically about three instructions—one 
concerning the defendants' right not to testify, another about conforming the font to be 
consistent throughout and about some minor rewording of one instruction. TT 439-40,443. 
Each of these concerns was addressed to defense counsel's satisfaction. TT 444. Following 
a final discussion with counsel for the State and the defense, the judge made a concluding 
query: "[I]f anyone has any objections to the instructions, speak up now or forever hold your 
peace. I don't hear anything." TT 463. 
Clearly, defense counsel "confirmed on the record that the defense had no objection to 
the instructions given by the trial court." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at f^ 10, (citing 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at If 55). Thus, any error was invited and defendants cannot challenge 
the reasonable doubt instruction on appeal. 
B. Defendants' Reyes Claim Is Unpreserved and Does Not Constitute 
"Exceptional Circumstances." 
Defendants' Reyes challenge is not properly before this Court. "As a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 'bring all 
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,11 14,54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v. 
Brown, 856P.2d358,361 (UtahApp. 1993)). To preserve a claim, a defendant must specify 
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the alleged error so that the trial court can "'assess [the] allegations by isolating relevant 
facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue.'" Id. 
at U 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at U 11. The 
exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defmed . . . and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993). 
Defendants concede that trial counsel did not preserve the issue they raise. See Aplt. 
Br. at 40. However, they argue that the fact that Reyes was not decided until after their trial 
constitutes an exceptional circumstance excusing their failure to preserve the claim. See 
Aplt. Br. at 41. In effect, they argue that they could not object at trial, because the basis for 
the objection did not yet exist. 
This very argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child. On appeal, he 
argued that a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due process principles 
announced in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. At trial, 
Lopez had not objected on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been decided. Id. On appeal, 
the supreme court had to "determine whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal." Id. 
The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the first time on 
appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error" or 'exceptional circumstances' 
exceptions exist." Id. 
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The case at bar is indistinguishable. Nothing prevented defendants from challenging 
the reasonable doubt instruction even before Reyes was decided. In Reyes itself, the State 
argued that the Robertson three-part test was unconstitutional, despite the absence of any 
authority declaring it unconstitutional. Moreover, this Court, in an opinion issued before 
defendants' trial, described the Robertson three-part test as "constitutionally flawed" and 
"not consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." See State v. Reyes, 2004 UT 
o 
App 8, ffif 22,30, 84 P.3d 841.° Nothing prevented defendants from preserving this issue by 
making this argument at trial. Accordingly, the claim is barred.9 
C. Defendants' Reyes Challenge Fails Because the Prosecutor Did Not 
Argue that the State Needed To Refute Only "Doubts That Are 
Sufficiently Defined." 
Even if defendants' claim were reviewable by this Court, it still lacks merit because 
the due process danger identified in the Reyes opinion did not arise here. 
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial, reproduced here in its entirety, 
contained the phrase "obviates all reasonable doubt": 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of 
innocence, and defendants are presumed innocent until they are proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And, incase of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she [is] entitled to an acquittal. 
This Court issued Reyes on January 15,2004. Defendants were tried in September 
2004. 
9
 Defendant does not claim that this Court can review his challenge to the reasonable 
doubt instruction because the error was structural. See Br. Aplt. at 37-41. Whether failure to 
object to a reasonable doubt instruction forecloses a claim of structural error is a question the 
supreme court left unresolved in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 18, 122 P.3d 543. 
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I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by reasonable 
doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in 
view of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt that is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind, 
convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence of the lack of the evidence in this case. 
MGP 84; CGP 93 (emphasis added) (Addendum A). 
The Reyes court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt'" concept to be "[ijnsightful 
and important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 
1126. 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of 
proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor [v. Nebraska, 
511 U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a 
two-step undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the 
validity of the doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and 
forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. 
Id. at II 27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test would 
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at U 28. 
Reyes thus holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden of 
proof only to the extent it would "permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts 
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that are sufficiently defined." Id. Consequently, where the State does not argue that it need 
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test does not diminish the State's 
constitutional burden. 
Defendants here do not claim, nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutor argued 
that the State need obviate only those doubts that are "sufficiently defined." See Aplt. Br. at 
37-41. In fact, the prosecutor never discussed the burden of proof at all during his opening 
or closing arguments. See TT 14-17,482-86, 502-510. Even when reviewing the elements 
instruction, the prosecutor never discusses reasonable doubt or makes any reference to the 
State's burden of proof. Clearly, the prosecutor did not argue that the State need not refute 
any doubts because they were not "sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, II 28. 
Defendant's claim fails for another reason. "[S]o long as the reasonable doubt 
instructions, 'taken as a whole,... correctly convey[ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury,' they pass constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, II 20, 122 P.3d 543 
(quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,22 (1994)). "Simply put, [the court] need only ask 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable 
doubt, namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.5" 
Id. at H 21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In Cruz, the supreme court 
approved a reasonable doubt instruction containing the sentence, "The law does not require 
that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all 
reasonable doubt." Id. at If 11. In the context of reasonable doubt instructions, "dispel" and 
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"obviate" are synonyms. So in effect, the Cruz jury, like the jury here, was told that the State 
must "obviate all reasonable doubt." Yet the Supreme Court approved the instruction. 
The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as a whole," 
they "correctly convey [ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 
If 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept was conveyed not only 
by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted above, but also by others. See, e.g„ Jury 
Instruction No. 2 (CGP 86) ("The plea of not guilty denies each and all of the essential 
allegations of the charge contained in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of 
proving each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt."); Jury Instruction No. 14 (CGP 99) ("If, after careful consideration of all 
the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant Christina L. 
Gray, guilty of Child Abuse as charged in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find her not guilty."). 
In sum, even if defendants' claims were not waived, they fails on the merits. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the defendants' conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisSfl%y of December, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
« 3 v x ^ v Q j i A ^ 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and defendants are presumed innocent until 
they are proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in case 
of a reasonable doubt as to whether his or her guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he or she entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doufcjt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
that is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof that satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must 
axise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
y 
